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RFASONABLENESS OF SF.AR.CH 
ACTING ON INFQRKATION FROM A COLLF.AGUE 
Regina v. PEEBLES - County Court of Vancouver -
No. CC 861468 - June 1988. 
A police officer worked with a reliable informer. The reliability was based 
on his information being accurate. The officer would sometimes pass the 
information on to colleagues who also found it to be reliable. In this case, 
the officer received information that the accused, (who was known to the 
police) would at a certain time meet someone at a specific location to sell 
heroin. The officer gave this information to the drug squad and officers who 
had acted before on information from this source caught the accused in the 
act. It took place as the officers were informed it would by their colleague . 
Even the car used had been described by the informer in detail. 
The arrest was made as the accused and another party approached the described 
parked car. The alleged buyer discarded a paper bag containing $5,550.00 cash 
and a search of the car resulted in finding a cache of heroin. The accused 
denied any knowledge of the heroin or the transaction. 
The reasonableness of the search and whether the arrest had been arbitrary 
became subject to a voir dire . The arresting and searching officers admitted 
to having no knowledge of the informer's reliability other than that their 
colleague's information had a favorable ratio in paying off. 
The search the officers conducted was warrantless. Consequently the Crown had 
to show that it was reasonable in compliance with s. 8 of the Charter.* (In 
situations other than the right to be secure against unreasonable search the 
party alleging the infringement of a right must show the infringement on the 
balance of probabilities). 
The Supreme Court of Canada had held that a warrantless search is ipso facto 
unreasonable unless the Crown demonstrates that it is not. In this case, the 
Crown relied on the common law that this search, authorized by statute (s.10 
(1) (c) N.C.A.), was reasonable. Case law does not only say that information 
supplied by a reliable informer may provide grounds necessary for a search 
warrant to be issued, but, "It would seem entirely logical and reasonable that 
such information can also provide the necessary reasonable grounds to iustify 
a warrantless search, where a warrantless search is authorized by law. * A 
mere statement by an informer that some unlawful activity will take place 
"would not constitute reasonable grounds for conducting a warrantless search 
or for making an arrest without warrant." Whether an informer's tip is more 
than mere gossip or rumour may depend on such things as details which are 
indicative of knowledge and the means by which the personal knowledge was 
*see HUNTER v. SOUTHAM INC., Volume 18, page 12 of this publication. 
**R. v. DEBOT 30 C. C.C . (3a) 207 - Ontario Court of Appeal . 
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acquired. These issues are relevant to the reliability of the information. 
After all, information must be reliable before it can be considered for 
grounds leading to the beliefs prerequisite to police action. The standard to 
be met to say that there is such belief is one of "reasonable probability." 
Was the aggregate of the information the officers had sufficient to say that 
there was sincere belief of a reasonable probability of illegal transaction? 
Secondly, the officers who conducted the search and effected the arrest had no 
personal knowledge of the reliability of the information. What they were told 
was double hearsay, so-to-speak. 
In relation to the latter the precedent judgement relied upon says, that it is 
unrealistic and incompatible with effective law enforcement and crime 
prevention that a police officer when acting on request of a fellow officer 
must firstly obtain from that officer information of the underlying facts to 
enable him to act independently in terms of prerequisite grounds. 
The totality of the circumstances (the detail of information; the pas t 
experience with the same source of information; acting on the knowledge of an 
experienced colleague) had given the officers who arrested and searched the 
ground to act as they did . They had corporate knowledge in the circumstances 
and what they had found at the scene prior to acting had corroborated the 
information given to them . Furthermore the search of the car was authorized 
under s. 10 (1) (a) N.C.A. 
The County Court Judge concluded that even if he was wrong in terms of the 
reasonableness and lawfulness of the arrest and search, admitting the evidence 
of the narcotics and money, would not bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. 
Evidence was admitted 
* * * * * 
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DOES THE CHOKE-HOLD RENDER A SEARCH UNREASONABLE? 
Regina v. JIEBER - County Court of Vancouver -
No. CC861483, February 1988 
Police officers received what they considered reliable infonriation that the 
accused was trafficking in heroin. and was on the night o.f his arrest storing 
his stock in his mouth ready for swallowing in case of apprehension. 
Consequently he was approached from behind and a choke-hold was applied. He 
was simultaneously told that his assailant was a police officer and that he 
was to open his mouth. The accused put up a struggle and tried to get away. 
He was successful but was immediately put in the same hold by another officer 
until he was obviously in distress. The hold was then released and a couple 
of slaps on the back resulted in two balloons containing the heroin. The 
accused was charged accordingly but acquitted in provincial court. The trial 
judge ruled that the choke-hold rendered the search unreasonable contrary to 
s. 8 of the Charter and that admitting the evidence could bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The accused had called a physician 
to testify what could happen as a result of the choke hold, such as choking, 
restriction of blood circulation causing the heart to stop, suffocation etc. 
This had been the main reason for holding that the search was unreasonable. 
The County Court Judge dealing with the Crown's appeal was not too impressed 
with the doctor shedding light on something that was already illuminated. He 
held that the trial judge had given inadequate consideration to the officers 
having all the grounds prerequisite to a legal search and that the ~ccused 
could have avoided all the unpleasant consequences of the choke-hold had he 
opened his mouth as he was told. The Supreme Court of Canada held* that a 
search is not necessarily unreasonable because a choke-hold is used. 
(Needless to say if it is applied on mere suspicion then it may be 
unreasonable.) Reading the Supreme Court of Canada's reasons for judgement 
one reaches the inevitable conclusion that the hold, if used upon reasonable 
and probable grounds that contraband is secreted in the mouth, does not by 
itself render a search unreasonable. Noting the careful wording by Canada's 
highest court the County Court Judge held that the search in this Weber case 
had been reasonable . 
Crown's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered 
* * * * * 
*COLLINS v. The Queen - See Volume 27 page 1 of this publication. 
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THE CQRIOUS •JOHN• 
Regina v. SAPIEHA - County Court of Vancouver 
No. CC 861570, February 1988 
The accused had a conversation with a policewoman who posed as a prostitute 
The gist of the conversation was the services to be provided and the price. 
During his trial he testified to the effect that the purpose of the 
conversation was not to receive any sexual services but simply to satisfy his 
curiosity what sexual acts prostitutes were willing to provide and for what 
price. The trial judge rejected this defence and held that conducting the 
conversation in a public place was sufficient to prove the allegation under s. 
195.1 (l)(c) C.C. 
The accused appealed his conviction. 
The County Court Judge held that the provincial court judge's view was 
erroneous in law. The purpose of "stopping or impeding" of any person must be 
for the purpose of "obtaining sexual services of a prostitute". If there is a 
doubt in relation to that purpose then the accused person must reap the 
benefit of the doubt. For instance conducting a sociological survey on the 
subject of price and services is not an offence under the section. What the 
accused claimed to be his object for engaging in the conversation makes the 
act an innocent one in terms of law. If the trial judge does not believe the 
accused then, of course, the defence is impotent. But if such a defence is 
believed or creates a reasonable doubt no conviction is possible. The trial 
judge had said that the accused's version of his intent was unreasonable in 
the circumstances. This was inadequate to deal with the accused's defence 
Considering the lack of sufficient consideration, .... 
The accused's appeal was allowed and a 
new trial was ordered. 
* * * * * 
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ADKISSABIUTY OF A STATEMENT MADE TO UNDER.COVER OFFICER IN CELL-BLOCK 
Regina v. HEBERT - BC Court of Appeal -
No. YU0063 Vancouver, July 1988 
A desk clerk of an inn was robbed by a man wearing a ski-mask. During several 
months of investigation police received confidential information that the 
accused was the person who committed the robbery. The accused was arrested 
and given an opportunity to consult with a lawyer who advised him regarding 
his right to refuse to give a statement. Consequently no statement was given. 
An undercover officer acting as a suspect under police investigation. engaged 
the accused in a conversation in the cell-block. The accused made an 
incriminating statement to him. 
At trial it was conceded that police knew of the advice the accused received 
from his counsel. The trial judge held that consequently the action of the 
police amounted to "a fraudulent subversion of the solicitor - client 
relationship". This relationship is one guaranteed by the Charter of Rights 
and Freedom he held. He ruled the statement inadmissable in evidence. The 
Crown did not adduce any further evidence and an acquittal resulted. 
The Crown appealed this decision as the issue is crucial to a police practice 
that has been approved by common law. The grounds of the appeal were strictly 
based on the constitutional arguments related to "right to counsel" and "the 
principles of fundamental justice". It should be noted that the issue of 
voluntariness in these circumstances is separate and was not argued, In other 
words, for now, this decision does not affect the subjective test to determine 
if an agent provocateur is a person in authority. Voluntariness is only an 
issue if the person to whom the statement was made was a person in authority 
and that the suspect knew that he was such a person. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal dealt firstly with the right to counsel argument and 
what lawyer/client relations are involved. It reviewed pre and post Charter 
cases where casual conversations with persons in authority had become a 
contentious matter in terms of propriety and inclusion in the Crown's case. 
Pre-Charter cases establish that obtaining a statement by subterfuge and 
deception is acceptable and it seems from the post-Charter cases that this is 
left unchanged. However, distinction is made between trickery in the 
official interrogation setting and surreptitious settings such as using an 
agent provocateur. 
In some cases the impropriety had been in the interview method where, for 
instance, a suspect was tricked or psychologically manipulated to respond to 
questions and/or suggestions after he clearly indicated to want to remain 
silent. The casual conversation a police driver (who ferried a suspect to 
the courthouse) had with the suspect that was calculated to be a continuation 
of an unsuccessful questioning of the suspect, was a means of circumventing 
ethics as well as the right to counsel. 
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Said one superior court justice 
" ... once an accused person has retained counsel to the knowledge 
of the police or other person in authority, the latter ought not to 
endeavour to interview and question that accused person without 
first seeking and obtaining the concurrence of his solicitor." 
Another superior court held in a case where legal advice had been obtained and 
a firm refusal to give a statement was indicated: 
n •••••• the officer deliberately went behind the back of counsel to 
obtain that admission and I hold that this is an interference with 
the right to counsel guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. If police officers having sole control of prisoners, can 
solicit admissions from those at a time that they are isolated from 
legal advise, the so-called right to counsel is impaired if not 
meaningless." 
The Supreme Court of Canada said in the trend setting Manninen* decision very 
much the same things although at the time Manninen made his utterances he had 
not received legal advice but had clearly stated he wanted to exercise his 
right to remain silent. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal held that this Hebert case is distinct from these 
precedents in that the deceptive practice used here was not in the 
interrogation setting. The conversation the agent provocateur had with the 
accused was not a continuation of the interrogation. Said the Court: 
"It cannot be logically contended that merely to engage an accused 
person in conversation at a time and place completely isolated from 
the interrogation process is to subvert the solicitor/client 
relationship." 
The B.C. Court of Appeal held that the precedents referred to above, should 
not be applied in non-interrogation settings where there is a complete absence 
of coercion or pressure. A perfectly voluntary and reliable statement should 
not be rejected. Lawyer/client relations and privileges in criminal law, do 
not have the kind of reach that if their warnings and advice are not followed, 
the evidence obtained by their clients not adhering to that advice in settings 
isolated from the interrogation process, would have to be excluded. If an 
undercover police agent engages a suspect in conversation, and if the agent's 
questions or utterance are not the repeat of what happened in the 
interrogation and are not a continuation or in tenor or otherwise connected to 
the interrogation, then there is no reason to consider such police action a 
breach of the suspect's right to counsel. 
In relation to the undercover operation being a breach of the right to the 
principles of fundamental justice, the B.C. Court of Appeal did not s ee things 
*see Volume 28, page 1 of this publication. 
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in the defence counsel's light'. Quoting from a U.S. judgement on the point 
the court ruled that judges are not to use the exclusionary rule to govern 
police conduct even if they find the conduct unfortunate, distasteful or 
inappropriate. The only time police practices in these circumstances are 
within their purview for exclusion is when the conduct is so inappropriate or 
repulsive that the community would be shocked; and this would only be the case 
if there is a clear connection between that conduct and the obtaining of the 
statement. 
Defence counsel had apparently argued that these views were contrary to the 
precedent set by the Supreme Court of Canada.* However, the court reiterated 
in conclusion that these cases deal with the regular interrogation process and 
do not purport to deal with the issues and circumstances as they are in this 
case. 
Crown's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered 
* * * * * 
*R. v. CLARKSON - Volume 24 - Page 36 of this publication 
R. v. HANNINEN - Volume 28 - Page 1 of this publication 
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ARBITRARY DETENTION AND ARREST 
DISnNCTION BE"NEEN ARREST BEFORE AND AFrKR. DEMAND 
Regina v. KEELING - BC Court of Appeal -
June 1988 
The B.C. Court of Appeal has since 1984 rejected submissions that all arrests 
for impaired driving are arbitrary where the Crown did not show that any of 
the conditions included in the public interest [section 450 (2)(d) C.C.) were 
. . * in issue. 
The accused Keeling, was involved in an accident. By personal policy the 
officer who demanded breath samples from the accused, arrested him, 
immediately following that demand, for the offence of impaired driving . The 
accused was convicted and appealed the conviction to the County Court. The 
County Court Judge who heard the appeal had ruled in March of 1987** that 
arresting all suspected impaired drivers by policy contravened the Charter as 
such practice amounts to arbitrary detention. Needless to say the appellant 
Keeling reminded the County Court Judge of this ruling and strongly urged a 
similar consideration. However the Judge declined to do so and reasoned that 
the previous case was distinct from this Keeling case. In the former case the 
officer had firstly arrested the suspected impaired driver and had then made 
his demand. In this Keeling case the sequence of events was reversed. This 
meant that when the officer effected the arrest the accused was already 
detained by means of a demand made on reasonable and probable grounds. The 
County Court Judge reasoned: 
n • •••• the appellant was already detained as a consequence of the 
demand that he take a test when he was told that he was "arrested" 
for impaired driving. The imposition of this "arrest" superimposed 
upon him after his initial detention is inconsequential, regardless 
of the policy of the officer, for as soon as the tests were finished 
he was released upon the condition of his promise to appear. Thus 
at all times he was lawfully detained for a legitimate reason and 
at no time could it be said that his detention was arbitrary." 
Mr. Keeling took this decision to the B.C . Court of Appeal which did not mince 
too many words and held that based on the findings by the County Court Judge 
the arrest of Mr. Keeling was not arbitrary. 
Accused's appeal was dismissed 
*see Volume 29, page 20 of this publication. 
** R. v. LABINE - County Court of Westminster -
No. X017908, Volume 28, page 36 of this publication. 
NOTE: 
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The issues surrounding policy arrests in the case previously dealt 
with by the B.C. Court of Appeal were distinct from the issue in 
this Keeling case. 
* * * * * 
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ARMED ROBBERY - FAIRNESS OF LINE-UP 
DOCTRINE OF RECENT POSSESSIORS 
Regina v. VAN BEEST - BC Court of Appeal - CA006060 -
April 1988 
Two men, armed with a shotgun and wearing coveralls, walked up to a bank, put 
bandannas on, on the sidewalk in front of the bank, went in and robbed bank 
personnel. The take was $29,000.00 including some US dollars and bait money. 
Crown witness M. was watching all this from behind the wheel of his car which 
was parked at the curb in front of the bank. He followed the men and saw them 
switch cars in an alley. The car they transferred to was a U-drive rented by 
the mother of one of the two men who were eventually charged with this 
offence, the Appellant Van Beest, being one of them. M. Also followed the U-
drive and alerted police to the house the two men were seen to enter. The 
house was staked out and four and one half hours later the appellant Van Beest 
was seen to leave on foot . A short distance from the house he was arrested. 
He had $1520.00 on him, most of it in brand new one hundred dollar bills. 
'When asked where he got the money he facetiously explained to have found it on 
the street he just walked on. He had not been seen to pick up anything. He 
was under observation at the time he claims to have found the money. A 
search warrant was executed and the house the two men had entered was found 
to contain a large portion of the money taken from the bank (bait money was 
included). Van Beest was convicted by a jury of armed robbery. The party who 
lived in the house was acquitted. Van Beest appealed his conviction. 
Several eight men line-ups were conducted. Each time the participants would 
wear the same disguises worn during the bank robbery and were asked to remove 
them. In one line-up (which like some others resulted in the appellant Van 
Beest being identified) only Van Beest and a bearded participant were asked to 
remove their disguises. Van Beest did not have a beard and the men seen by 
Crown witness M. were not bearded either. This the defence claimed made this 
line-up unfair and invalidated the identification, the major, if not the only 
issue in this circumstantial case. Unfairness was also claimed on the basis 
of the line-up participants wearing disguises which typify crimes like 
robbery. The practice implies that eight criminals are on display and it 
compels the witness to identify someone. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal held that the practice was unusual but did not render 
the evidence resulting from the line-up without probative value as most of the 
witnesses had only seen the culprits in disguise. 
The jury had all of the evidence (including the defence theory on this issue 
and exhaustive and accurate instructions from the Trial Judge) to conclude if 
the identification was sufficient. Furthermore the conviction was not on 
identification alone but was supported by circumstantial evidence, fo r 
instance Van Beest coming from the place where the proceeds of the robbery 
were kept and having part of them on his person. 
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Another interesting aspec t of the case is the application of the doctrine of 
recent possession. Before any weight should be put on the accused's 
possession of proceeds of the robbery, knowledge on the part of Van Beest that 
it were such proceeds is essential. For this the Trial Judge explained the 
doctrine of recent possession to the jury. He in essence said that if the 
jury believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the money was part of the take in 
the robbery and if on the same test of proof they did not believe the 
explanation Van Beest gave about the money then there was no explanation. He 
then outlined how an inference of guilt may be drawn where a person possesses 
the proceeds of an indictable offence at a time recent to the commission of 
the crime and fails to give an explanation that may reasonably be true. 
This dictum hails from the doctrine that despite the presumption of innocence 
which includes the right to remain silent, there comes a time that someone is 
so surrounded by incriminating circumstances that he either explains or stands 
condemned. 
Many have predicted that this common law doctrine offends s. 11 (d) of the 
Charter (presumption of innocence) and would become a thing of the past. The 
Trial Judge told the jury that the doctrine was not one of law but of fact 
The inference they were allowed to draw was one of common sense. 
Defence counsel did not attack the application of the doctrine and the B.C 
Court of Appeal approved of all the instructions left with the jury. 
It seems not unreasonable to conclude that the B.C. Court of Appeal considers 
the doctrine of recent possession to be alive and well in this province as did 
it's Manitoba counter part in 1986 * 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction for armed robbery 
upheld 
Comment: Another aspect of the doctrine of recent possession that is spoiling 
for a Charter challenge is that the explanation capable of rebutting 
the inference must be made at the time the person is found to be in 
possession or in the witness stand. This compounds the argument 
that the doctrine flies in the face of the right to remain silent. 
It simply forces an accused person to testify or suffer the 
consequences of the doctrine's application. 
*Regina v. Ka/LYK 27 C.C.C. (3d) 61 
this publication 
Also see Volume 25 page 28 of 
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Perhaps the Courts can now hold that the issues are not distinct 
from those in HOLMES v. The Queen (see page 46 of this volume). If 
the doctrine is not a reverse onus clause or presumption perhaps the 
position can be taken that it simply includes the defence of 
innocent purpose. In other words that part of the doctrine that 
seems to compel an explanation is then a shield instead of a sword 
* * * * * 
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ADKISSABILITY OF A CONFESSION 
RIGllT TO COUNSEL - VOIDNTAR.INESS 
Regina v. SISHEY - Supreme Court of British Columbia -
March 1988. 
A number of youths had been bugging a man who appears to have been their 
target on a regular basis. This time one of the youths threw a rock at the 
unfortunate fellow. The projectile hit the man's head and killed him. The 
accused, who had turned eighteen years old a couple of weeks before was 
detained as a suspect and was questioned in the early morning hours, a few 
hours after the fatal incident. 
At first, right from the time he was apprehended, the accused acted as though 
he was puzzled about the reason for his detention. -:l:le even inquired about the 
identity of the man he was to have assaulted. He also said, "I want to phone 
my mother." The response to all of this was, "We'll straighten things out at 
the office." 
At the office the accused's clothes were taken away from him and he was told 
of his right to remain silent and counsel. In terms of the latter he was in 
no way discouraged from using the phone that was available in the room in 
which he was interviewed, neither was he encouraged or invited to do so. 
In terms of his right to remain silent, the accused indicated that he "should 
not say anymore" after his exculpatory statement. It was obvious to the 
officer at this point that the accused was fighting to hold back his tears. 
The officer encouraged the accused to cry and to tell him the truth. He 
reminded him that sometimes "things do no always end up the way they start" 
and that this was not a dream that is over when you wake up. "Things do 
happen and I want to know why and how .... tell me." Despite the accused's, "I 
don't think I should give you a statement .... my lawyer told me not to .... l've 
had problems in the past.", the officer insisted to hear more than, "I didn't 
mean to hurt him" which had followed the outright denial of any involvement. 
The accused then asked if he could phone his mother. The officer dialed and 
was present when the accused tells his mother, "I killed someone." After this 
the officer explains the situation to the mother and arranges for a visit 
later in the morning. The accused then tells all. His blood/alcohol level is 
determined after the statement is taken and found to be 70 milligrams per 100 
milliliters. 
Needless to say that defence counsel did everything possible to keep the 
confession from the jury in this second degree murder trial. During the voir 
dire to determine the admissibility of the statement the defence claimed that 
the accused's right to counsel had been denied him and that the circumstances 
surrounding the confession could not withstand the stringent test of 
voluntariness. A synopsis of the argument is as follows 
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The accused's call to his mother was equivalent to a call to 
counsel; there should have been an overt invitation or urging for 
the accused to call a lawyer for advice. By simply not placing such 
phone call in these serious circumstances the accused had not waived 
his right to counsel. An atmosphere of oppression had dominated the 
milieu during the accused's meeting with the police interrogator. A 
boy, barely eighteen years old, was in custody for the most serious 
charge and interviewed by a person in authority in the bowels of the 
night. He was intoxicated and emotionally distraught. His personal 
belongings, even his clothing were taken away from him and after 
clearly indicating that he wished to remain silent he was 
emotionally intimidated to confess. All of this surely rendered the 
statement inadmissable in evidence, argued defence counsel. 
The Supreme Court trial Judge recognized that there are at least two cases 
decided by the Supreme Court of Canada that seem to support the defence's 
submissions. 
The one case is about Mrs. Clarkson* who was accused of having murdered her 
husband. She, in an advanced state of intoxication had insisted that there 
was no point in having a lawyer involved during her interview. She seemed to 
insist on confessing and the police did not do anymore than inform her of her 
right to counsel and did not prevent her from using the phone if she wanted 
to. In addition to this Mrs. Clarkson was accompanied by her aunt who 
strongly advised her niece to first get legal advice and the police to 
postpone the interview. The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that in view of 
the entrenched right to counsel since 1982 (Charter) the test if a right had 
been waived is no longer an "operating mind" on the part of the person who 
waived it, but also that that mind has an understanding of the consequences 
This the Supreme Court of Canada said was judicial fairness. (It did not 
elaborate too much on the depth of that understanding which could go from 
knowing that it will be used as evidence to being able to assess the 
evidential weight it will have, its contribution towards being convicted and 
the penalty this may result in). 
Then the Supreme Court of Canada decided the Manninen case** in 1987. It in 
essence, held that mere informing a detainee of his rights may not suffice to 
meet the authority's obligation in respect to the right of a detained person. 
When Manninen said he wanted advice from a lawyer no one obstructed him to use 
the available telephone, but the questioning simply continued and some very 
inculpatory obscenities were uttered by him. Police should have made an 
overt gesture for the suspect to avail himself of the phone to seek the 
advice he indicated to want. Failure to do so had amounted to an infringement 
* 
** 
CLARKSON v. The Queen (1986) 50 C.R. (3) 289. Also Volume 24, page 
38 of this publication. 
R. v. MANNINEN (1987) 58 C.C C. (3d)97. Also Volume 28, page 1 of 
this publication. 
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of Manninen's right to counsel. 
In this case, the accused Sismey, had indicated that he should exercise his 
right to remain silent but the questioning continued. He wanted to phone his 
mother from the time he was apprehended but was not overtly assisted or given 
an opportunity to do so until he broke down after his first (exculpatory) 
statement and subsequent conceding he was responsible for the death. 
Defence Counsel argued that the Clarke and Manninen cases were 
indistinguishable from this case. Sismey indicated he wanted to remain silent 
and the questioning continued; he wanted to phone his mother and was not 
overtly accommodated or assisted until he in essence confessed. Phoning 
mother is in these circumstances not distinct from seeking counsel and was 
therefore part of his constitutional right to counsel. 
The B.C. Supreme Court trial judge did not agree with the defence theory. The 
Justice placed considerable weight on the advanced state of intoxication of 
Mrs. Clarke which disabled her to consciously waive her right to counsel or to 
have any appreciation for the possible gravity of the consequences of a 
confession. Sismey, who had by his own admission been in trouble before and 
had received advice from counsel on those occasions understood his rights 
sufficiently to know the obligations they place on the authorities. 
Furthermore, Sismey's state of intoxication (70 mlg) was not anywhere near 
that of Mrs. Clarke. Sismey had even said, "If I say anything I'll hang 
myself." This corroborated that he understood and was aware adequately for 
the purpose of judicial fairness. 
In relation to his right to counsel, the trial judge ruled that Sismey was 
fully aware but chose not to assert that right. The phone call to his mother 
and his desire to place this call from the outset was in this case not the 
equivalent in law to contacting a lawyer. The tenor of the conversation with 
the officer and with his mother was not one that would cause inference of 
seeking legal counsel either directly or indirectly. It was clearly a 
parent/son matter. Therefore the Hanninen case was of no consequence here. 
In terms of voluntariness the Supreme Court of Canada held in the Hobbins 
case* that the absence of hope of advantage or fear of prejudice alone will 
not necessarily assure the admission of a statement into evidence. The 
general atmosphere surrounding the making of the statement must be free of 
oppression. Timidity or a subjective fear of the police "will not avail to 
avoid the admissibility of a statement" unless there are external 
circumstances brought about by police that cause doubts on the voluntariness 
In other words, doing everything right in an oppressive milieu that may, for 
instance, be caused by the demeanour or deportment of police officers may be 
casting doubts about voluntariness which must be resolved in favour of the 
accused person. 
*HOBBINS v. The Queen 66 C.C.C. (2d) 292. 
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In this case the officer was persistent and had some persuasive methods of 
questioning. However, the aggregate of the entire elements had not created 
the oppressive atmosphere that casts doubts on voluntariness 
The confession was admitted in 
evidence. 
* * * * * 
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GOOD FAim - ADKISSl:BILITY OF EVIDENCE 
Regina v. PINSKE - BC Court of Appeal -
July 1988 CA 007803 
The accused was involved in a major motor vehicle accident in which his 
passenger lost his life . 
The accused was injured and police demanded a blood sample from him under the 
provisions of the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act as they then were in 1985. Analysis 
showed that the blood/alcohol level was 90 milligrams per 100 milliliters. An 
expert certified that this level was 130 milligrams at the time of driving. 
This and his driving at the time of the accident caused the Crown to allege 
that the accused caused the death of his passenger by being criminally 
negligent. 
By the time the accused was tried the prov1s1ons under the Motor Vehicle Act 
by means of which the blood sample was taken, had been declared without force 
of effect due to excessiveness of that legislation in light of our 
constitution. Consequently the trial judge would not allow the evidence of 
the blood analysis in evidence. The accused was acquitted. 
The Crown appealed and submitted that the police had acted in good faith as 
the law they relied on and complied with to demand the blood sample was 
sincerely believed to be valid. The officer had no reason to think otherwise. 
Due to g~od faith on the part of police the administration of justice could 
not have been brought into disrepute if the evidence of analysis had been 
admitted. 
The parties to the proceedings both relied on cases decided by the B.C. Court 
of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada. The defence relied on R. v. 
THERENS and the Crown on the Sieben , Collins and Gladstone cases.* 
In Therens the Supreme Court of Canada held that the infringement of the right 
to counsel was a flagrant violation on the part of police and had to result, 
without any further consideration to circumstances, in exclusion of all 
subsequent evidence. This despite the fact that police had acted in 
compliance with what at the time was an accepted practice. Yet in the Sieben 
case, where police used a writ of assistance to search, the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that the evidence resulting from the search was admissible due to 
*Regina v. THERENS - 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481 - Volume 21, page 1 of this 
publication 
Regina v. GLADSTONE - Volume 22, page 22 of this publication 
COLLINS v. The Queen - Volume 27 page 1 of this publication 
Regina v. SIEBEN (1987), S.C.R. 295 
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the fact that at the time of the search the officers had no reason to believe 
that the writ and its enabling legislation offended the Charter and was 
invalid. That was not judicially decided until after the search. 
Consequently they had acted in good faith and admission of the evidence would 
not bring disrepute on the administration of justice. 
In the Gladstone case the B.C. Court of Appeal ruled similarly in regard to an 
accepted investigation practice which subsequently was ruled to offend the 
Charter. Again good faith on the part of police, caused the evidence to be 
admissible. 
The Supreme Court of Canada in the Collins case elaborates on the exclusionary 
rule' and observes that real evidence that has been obtained in a manner that 
violates the Charter would rarely operate unfairly and should only be excluded 
if it renders the trial unfair. The Court also seemed to explain the Therens 
decision by saying that where a person is "conscripted" (the breathalyzer laws 
compelling the giving of samples of breath for instance) to supply evidence 
that an infringement of a Charter right will render a trial unfair if that 
evidence is admitted. However, even then, there is no automatic exclusion of 
evidence as it is still subject to consideration of other factors. 
On the surface it seems that this case is indistinguishable from the precedent 
in Therens. The accused was compelled under the law as it then was to allow a 
sample of blood .to be taken from him. However, the B. C. Court of Appeal has 
indicated in previous cases, that it is of the view that the "flagrant" 
violation of the Charter in Therens, was due to a lack of good faith. There 
was a directive from the Saskatchewan A.G. to consider all persons under 
demand to supply breath samples, to be detained. The officers had not 
complied with the directive and hence the infringement of the right to counsel 
was "flagrant". This has also been reasoned by other courts to explain why 
good faith was not considered in Therens. 
In any event the B.C. Court of Appeal held that due to the good faith on the 
part of the officer in this Pinske case it is distinct from the Therens 
decision. Reiterated the Court: 
" .... conduct of officers is to be judged in relation to what they 
knew or ought to have known in respect of Charter rights at the 
time the search took place." (R. v. GLADSTONE). 
The evidence of blood/alcohol content is relevant to criminal negligent 
driving. Consideration must be given to the principle of good faith which is 
capable of rendering the evidence admissible in the circumstances as they were 
in this case. For this and other reasons 
The Crown's appeal was allowed and a 
new trial was ordered. 
* * * * * 
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THEFr OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
STEWART v. The Queen - Supreme Court of Canada -
May 1988 
A union organizer was in need of the names and addresses of all personnel at a 
hotel. He offered a security guard money to obtain this information for him 
The guard went to management and reported to have been counselled to steal 
this information. Consequently the organizer was charged with counselling a 
theft. At trial he was acquitted but the Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's 
appeal and substituted a conviction. The accused appealed this to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. 
For the purpose of this case the parties to the trial agreed that the 
security guard did not have authorization to access the personnel files and 
that no physical object was counselled to be taken. The information was 
simply confidential in the circumstances and had no direct monetary value 
(although it could be the key to objectives that may be valuable in the 
future). In other words, even if the list was surreptitiously photocopied and 
the original rep1aced, then what was taken was purely intangible and of no 
value, as such, other than the sheets of paper the information was copied on 
and the cost of copying. 
Defence counsel argued that if what was counselled to be taken was not 
anything tangible or physical, it could not have amounted to a theft . 
According to the definition of such a crime one has to take "anything" 
The Supreme Court of Canada responded that "anything" refers to anything of 
proprietary right. 
There was no intention to deprive the hotel (employer) of anything. The 
Supreme Court said that confidential information is not property as intended 
by Parliament in section 283 C.C. (definition of theft). If Parliament 
intends to create an offence for the protection of confidential and private 
information it must do so by means of specific legislation. 
The Court reasoned that if a person looked at confidential information not 
meant for his eyes and memorizes it, he does not remove anything and does not 
convert anything physical to his own use. What he does is deprive someone of 
the confidentiality of the information. The court did not say that such a 
deed is not serious and an inappropriate invasion of privacy. However, it 
does not amount to theft as defined in the Criminal Code and at common law. 
The Supreme Court of Canada also explored the possibility of the act amounting 
to fraud. Again the Crown would have to show a dishonest deprivation that 
would prejudice the economic interests of the victim (although actual 
financial loss is not essential). To say that if the employees organized 
wages may rise is not the jeopardy or loss the Court appeared to be talking 
about . If the hotel had intended to deal with the information in a 
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commercial way and their opportunity had been jeopardized then counselling to 
commit fraud would have been an appropriate charge to allege 
Accused's appeal allowed 
Acquittal restored 
See also Volume 24, page 6 of this publication (R. v. OFFLEY) Alberta Court of 
Appeal . 
* * * * * 
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PROOF OF KNOlll.EDGE 'WHEN USntG JARGON 
Regina v. REED - County Court of Westminster - X018506 -
January 1988 
An undercover officer went to an apartment accompanied by a female friend for 
the purpose of purchasing cocaine. There were several persons in the 
apartment and there was an obvious reluctance to let the officer in. His 
female companion was apparently welcome and entered the inner sanctum while 
the officer remained just inside the entrance door. A woman approached the 
officer with a plastic bag, she said it contained "good coke, in the bottom of 
the bag". She claimed there was also some "crack" in it. The officer opened 
the bag examined the content and said he would buy it. The accused who had 
been in the vicinity during all this piped up and said, "Where is the cash?" 
The officer gave the accused $475.00, who counted and pocketed the money. 
The successful defence is somewhat unbelievable. In view of the slang, jargon 
or street language used in identifying the substance contained in the bag, the 
accused received payment for, did he (the accused) know it was cocaine? He 
had not used the language or in anyway indicated what the substance was. He 
only knew it was worth $475.00. Had the charge been against the woman who 
had made the sales pitch, the defence of lack of knowledge would have been 
unsuccessful. The trial judge held he could not take judicial notice that the 
slang terms meant cocaine for the accused. Hence there was a doubt in respect 
to the requisite knowledge which had to be resolved in favour of the accused. 
Accused acquitted. 
Comments: There is a body of case law that seems to support that specific 
knowledge of the substance possessed or trafficked is not necessary. 
All that is required that there is no doubt the accused person knew 
that he trafficked or possessed a restricted or prohibited 
substance. Seems that irresistible inference can be drawn in this 
case. 
* * * * * 
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•coRSEQUENCES OF THE 'BOROGOFSKI' CASK 
ROADSIDE SOBRIETY TEST CONSTITUTING DKTENTION• 
In November of 1987* the B.C. Court of Appeal held that a person who's ability 
to drive is suspected to be impaired, is detained from the moment he is 
stopped and his condition is observed. A subsequent sobriety test is a 
possible means of gaining additional evidence from the accused. Consequently, 
if the suspect was not made aware of his right to counsel his right is 
infringed and the evidence subject to suppression under the Charter's 
enforcement section (24(2)). 
Apparently some practicing police personnel are unaware of this precedent as 
too many drinking/driving allegations bite the dust on this issue. Many of 
these cases had a date of offence subsequent to this Bonogofski decision. 
It is also of interest that the Ontario Court of Appeal have since the 
Bonogofski decision held that a roadside sobriety test does in the absence of 
an arrest beforehand, not constitute detention. Needless to say this 
contradiction in judicial views needs to be settled by the Supreme Court of 
Canada. In the meantime B.C. police personnel beware. 
At the B.C. Provincial Court level another issue has arisen in relation to the 
roadside sobriety test. There are now two cases where the evidence obtained 
by means of a roadside test was suppressed as the suspects had not been 
advised that they did not need to perform the test. The only Charter 
provision that may have been brought into the picture is that contained in s. 
7 which stipulates no deprivation except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice. If this is correct the reasoning comes close to the U.S . 
"Miranda" principle, and will, considering the current trend in our courts of 
superior jurisdiction, not likely be sustained. Although it is a suspect's 
right not to provide authorities with evidence against himself (except when 
the law requires him to do so) it is not his right to be made aware of this. 
If this was not so, a warning would have to be given in numerous other 
circumstances. 
In practice the warning of voluntariness (if one can call it that) is 
customary when a suspect is invited to explain. This warning is not to meet 
the right of the accused to remain silent nor is it mandatory. It is strictly 
a means of enhancing the requisite proof to admissibility i.e. that the 
statement was made voluntarily where the suspect knowingly speaks to a person 
in authority--someone who he believes can effect the path of prosecution. 
Furthermore the issues appear distinct from one another where a statement is 
involved or in circumstances not different from a roadside sobriety test. 
Where a police officer directly observes the results of the test he can vouch 
for the truth of his testimony. Where he relates what a suspect told him he 
*see Volume 29, page 1 of this publication. 
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can only vouch for what is said but not for the truth of the content of the 
statement. Consequently, if the Crown adduces the statement to prove the 
truth of its content, it is hearsay and only admissible in evidence as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. Absence of inducement or hope of advancement 
(voluntariness) is requisite to that admissibility only as .statements made 
involuntarily cannot be relied upon to be true. Therefore to compare the 
roadside sobriety test with statements in terms of admissibility of evidence, 
seems incorrect. 
* * * * * 
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EXECUTION OF SEAR.CH WARRANT 
DETENTION OF OCCUPANTS 
Regina v. CARSWELL - County Court of Vancouver Island 
Victoria 44079, January 1988 
Armed with an appropriate search warrant police officers announced their 
presence and purpose at the accused's residence. The door was answered by 
three other occupants of the house. The accused was in the bathroom. Police 
took control over these four occupants by herding them into the living room 
and requesting them to stay there until the search was completed. In one of 
the bedrooms a quantity of marihuana was found along with baggies and scales. 
When asked who's bedroom this was, the accused identified himself as being the 
occupant. He was taken into the room and arrested for possession for the 
purpose of trafficking and then for the first time, informed of his right to 
counsel and asked if he wants to avail himself of a lawyer's services. He 
responded, "No, not at this time" or words to that effect. He is then shown 
what was found in the room and despite having been aware of his right to 
remain silent he admits the narcotics and paraphernalia are his. He adds in 
the same breath however, that he cannot be had "for the purpose" as the scales 
don't function. He declined to identify the dried substance that was found 
but conceded that it was for his own use. 
At his Trial a voir dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of this 
substance, the conversation and exhibits. 
Without relating all of the reasoning on the part of the Trial Judge it was 
predictable that he found that all the persons being controlled in the living 
room were detained from the time that control was assumed. This meant that 
the detention was continuous from that time on. 
For the accused the only thing that changed when his arrest was effected was 
that detention was confirmed, he was informed of the charge against him and he 
was made aware of his right to remain silent and to counsel In essence then, 
there were two stages to his detention in terms of the Charter requirements, 
separated from one another by the point in time when he was made aware of his 
right to counsel - before and after so-to-speak. During the "before" period 
his right to counsel had been infringed and consideration whether to suppress 
the evidence obtained from the accused had to be given . What he conceded to 
and evidence obtained "after" also needed to be scrutinized for the purpose of 
admissibility in terms of voluntariness of statements and whether the "no, not 
at this time" was in fact a waiver of his right to counsel. 
In regards to voluntariness there was little to review. There were no 
improprieties such as threats or inducements. In as far as the waiver to 
rights, the person must be an informed individual. He had demonstrated to be 
aware of the purposes of the police and was also quite conversant about the 
essentials needed to prove the offence for which he was arrested. The 
comments and answers showed a full appreciation of the nature of the police 
questions and what was involved. His declining to consult counsel was 
therefore an appropriate waiver of his right to counsel. 
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Although there was a "before" and "after" period as explained above the 
detention of the accused had been continuous. Therefore the whole period was 
contaminated with the Charter infringement that occurred in the "before" 
period. This means that all of the evidence obtained was .subject to 
consideration for suppression under s. 24 (2) Charter. With the statements 
being voluntary and the waiver to right to counsel being a genuine one the 
only consideration left was whether admission could brLng the administration 
of justice into disrepute. The Trial Judge concluded that the evidence 
obtained from the accused during the "before" period had to be excluded. 
Whatever came during the "after" period was admissible 
* * * * * 
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UNREASONABLE SF.ARCH RESULTING IN SEIZURE OF 
ONE KARIHUANA GIGARETrE - ADMISSIBILITY 
Regina v. FOLK - County Court of Westminster - X018502 -
March 1988. 
A police officer was in a parking lot near an arcade, notorious for young 
people trading drugs. Not only did police officers know about its reputation 
but so did the Trial Judge from presiding over charges arising from 
trafficking at that location. 
The officer observed the accused wandering away from the side of an occupied 
car after he obviously saw the officer. The officer called him back, asked 
for permission to search and then did so while the accused, of his own 
volition, held his hands above his head. One marihuana cigarette was found 
and he was charged with that possession. If the officer had reasonable 
grounds for doing so, the search, of course, was lawful. Other than the 
location being known for drug trade and the officer's belief that the accused 
wandered away because of his presence, there was nothing in addition to 
substantiate the officer's position that he searched lawfully. Wandering on a 
public parking lot did fall short of being grounds prerequisite to a lawful 
search and consequently the search was unreasonable. However, the Trial Judge 
held that admitting the evidence would not affect the reputation of the 
administration of justice. A conviction followed as did an appeal by the 
accused. 
The County Court Judge agreed that the accused's right to be secure against 
unreasonable search had been infringed and gave consideration to the defence 
argument that the offence was a minor one. He reviewed cases on the point 
that where the offence is less serious there is greater vulnerability to the 
reputation of the administration of justice if, despite the infringement of a 
right, evidence against an accused is admitted. In other words the lesser the 
offence the more likely evidence obtained in "a manner that infringed or 
denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by the Charter" will be excluded.* 
One marihuana cigarette is not serious argued defence counsel and since the 
cigarette was obtained by means of an unreasonable search the precedents 
indicate that the evidence must be suppressed. 
The County Court Judge disagreed and reasoned that the gravity of the offence 
must not be measured by the quantity of a narcotic Must one cigarette be 
excluded and two be admitted? What about three or four cigarettes? "The 
correct way to determine the seriousness is to consider the entire 
circumstances" responded the appeal Judge. In different circumstances one 
cigarette may be classified as a minor violation. Here we had a location 
where narcotics and drugs are trafficked among young people. The place is 
notorious and is problematic causing anxiety and concern in the community. By 
equating the quantity of contraband to the gravity of the offence in these 
*see also R. v. Collins , Volume 27, page 1 of this publication. 
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circumstances is inadequate to meet the onus on the accused to show that 
admission of the cigarette in evidence could bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute 
* * * * * 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
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BEVARE OF RELYING OR EX.TRA.crs mmm K. v. ACT 
TO PROVE PREVIOUS RECORD IR CRillIRAL PROCEKDIRGS 
Regina v. HAI.A - Supreme Court of BC - Chilliwack 13900 
March 1988 
The accused had been convicted of impaired driving. The Crown had served 
notice on him that by virtue of previous convictions it was seeking a greater 
penalty. The accused did not acknowledge the previous convictions and the 
burden of proof fell on the Crown to prove them. It did so by means of an 
extract certified by the Superintendent of Motor Vehicles under section 75 
M.V. Act. The Trial Judge accepted the extract as proof. The accused 
appealed the sentence that was consequently imposed. 
The Supreme Court Justice, bound by precedence,* reminded that where there is 
a dispute in regard to the previous conviction the certified extract is mere 
hearsay evidence. It may be proof of its content for purposes under the M.V 
Act but in this case provisions under the Criminal Code had to be adhered to 
[s. 500 (4) and 594 (1) (a) C.C.]. 
The Justice then asked the Crown if it wanted an adjournment to produce the 
necessary proof. 'When this resulted in an application for an adjournment the 
appellant objected and submitted that the Crown knew or ought to have known 
how to prove a previous conviction. It failed to do so. Considering the 
strict application of procedure required in criminal cases and the fact that 
the appellant's liberty is at stake, no adjournment was granted. 
Sentence appeal allowed 
* * * * * 
*ALBRIGHT v. The Queen - Supreme Court of Canada -
1987, Y.W.R. 577 
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•.ARBITRARILY CONTINUING CUSTODY• 
•CHARTER REKKDY FOR SUCH DJFR.INGEKElfr• 
Regina v. ROY - BC Court of Appeal - Vancouver CA008400 -
April 1988 
Everything was done right by the police officer who arrested the appellant ROY 
for impaired driving. All evidence supporting the impairment was secured by 
observing the accused, When they arrived at the police station the accused 
refused to comply with the demand for breath samples. He was placed in cells 
for four hours before he was released, Apparently this sustained detention 
could not be justified by any of the provisions in section 450 C.C. and was 
considered to be arbitrary detention contrary to s . 9 of the Charter. 
The Trial Judge had reasoned that all the evidence for impaired driving had 
been secured before the accused's right was infringed and that no remedy was 
required in relation to that charge. However, the refusal was during and 
possibly as a result of the detention. Consequently the evidence of refusal 
was excluded under s. 24 (2) of the Charter. This resulted in a conviction 
for impaired driving and an acquittal for the refusal. 
The accused appealed arguing that the appropriate remedy was a judicial stay 
of proceedings under s. 24 (1) of the Charter in relation to both charges. 
The Court of Appeal simply responded that the Trial Judge s conclusion was the 
appropriate course in the circumstances 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
* * * * * 
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USE OF BODYPACK - UNREASONABLE SEARCH 
INTERCEPTING PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS 
Regina v. WIGGENS* - B.C. Court of Appeal -
CA 007885 - June 1988 
The accused invited someone to invest in a ship he had recently purchased in 
England. He promised a five to one return on the money. The prospective 
investor went to police as the business the accused intended to do with the 
ship was to transport, import and deal in narcotics. From thereon-in every 
meeting regarding the deal was recorded by means of a bodypack. The accused 
had not been secretive with the details of his operation and an allegation of 
conspiracy with three other persons was successfully prosecuted by actually 
proving the substantive offence of importing narcotics. The accused appealed 
his conviction on several grounds, the most interesting of which is the 
argument that the evidence of the recorded conversations should not have been 
admitted into evidence as the surreptitious methods used amounted to an 
unreasonable search contrary to s.8 of the Charter. This kind of a search 
should not be free of "judicial supervision8 • Defence counsel conceded that a 
person is not violating the privacy provisions of the Criminal Code if he or 
she records his or her own conversation with another party. He contended that 
where police use this method to collect evidence, the practice does offend 
the Charter right to be secure against unreasonable searches by authorities. 
Furthermore, the conversations were not simply recorded but simultaneously 
transmitted to police. This caused interception and brought the matter within 
the Privacy Act. 
Like the Trial Judge,** the B.C. Court of Appeal rejected the accused's 
arguments. 'When a person becomes party to a communication that is meant to be 
private, any participant to it can give up his or her claim to privacy. 
Taping simply assures accuracy, and is no different in law, to a person making 
notes and relying on them to testify. In practice the former manner is far 
more reliable. There is simply no reasonable expectation of privacy where one 
party to it consents to divulging its content or to have it intercepted.· 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
* See Regina v. WIGGENS - Volume 30 page 17 of this publication . 
**Ibid, Vol. 30 page 17. 
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POSSESSION OF A WEAPON DANGEROUS TO THE PDBLIC PF.ACE 
REI.ATIONSHIP BE"l'VEKN POSSESSION - INTENT AND USE 
Regina v. DAVIS - County Court of Kootenay -
C.C. 130389 - December 1987. 
The accused spotted his ex-wife and two men in a pub. On his way to the 
washroom he engaged in an insulting and shameful conversation with them. He 
referred to his wife sleeping around and strongly recommended that she and 
her companions should be going home for that purpose. He then produced a buck 
knife and proposed to slit the throat of the ex-wife's new boyfriend. He also 
waved the knife in front of his ex-spouse so she had to move backwards. 
The accused testified that he had the knife as a tool for use in his work 
'When he saw his ex-wife and while engaging in the conversation he, on the 
sudden and impulsively used it as the Crown witnesses claimed. 
The County Court Judge in deciding whether the accused was in possession of a 
weapon dangerous to the public peace, reiterated the law surrounding this 
offence.* 
"The formation of the unlawful purpose which may be 
inferred from circumstances in which the weapon is used, 
must precede its use. The interval of time between the 
formation of the purpose and the use of the 't:1eapon need 
not be long. It may in some cases be very short, but the 
gap must be significant." (R. v. FLACK) 
The County Court applied this test to the evidence and was not satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that there was proof of a sufficient gap in terms of 
time between the forming of the purpose and the use of the weapon. 
NOTE: 
Accused acquitted 
Considering the evidence it seems that a charge of assault of the 
ex-spouse rnai have fared better. Surprisingly no reference was made 
to decisions * at the court of appeal level on the very issues 
involved in this case 
* R. v. BACKMAN - Volume 21 page 32 of this publication 
** R. v. FLACK 1968 4 CRNS - 121 
R. v. PROVERBS 9 C.C.C. (30) 249 
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SEIZURE OF ITEMS BELIEVED TO BE THE PROCEEDS OF 
AN INDICTABLE OFFENCE BUT NOT MENIIONED IN THE SEARCH VARRANI 
Regina v. OPPEN - County Court of Caribou -
Quesnel CCR 2196 - January 1988. 
Police officers searched the accused's home looking for specific items 
mentioned in the.search warrant. They came upon a video recorder with the 
serial number removed. An identical recorder was stolen from the post-
secondary educational institution where the accused worked as a janitor. 
Without having the warrant amended or a new one issued, police seized the 
recorder. The Trial Judge dismissed the charge of possession of stolen 
property as the seizure was unreasonable and taken as the result of a 
warrantless search. Although the Crown conceded inclusion of the recorder in 
the warrant would have been simple (as it could have been accomplished by a 
telephone call), it appealed the acquittal, relying on s.445 C.C. to show that 
the seizure was for all intents and purposes done by authorization through the 
search warrant. 
Section 445 C.C. provides that things in addition to those mentioned in a 
search warrant, may be seized if there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
they were obtained by, used or to be used in the commission of an indictable 
offence. The defence (to summarize its submissions) in essence argued that 
this provision is now overshadowed by the Charter right to be secure of 
unreasonable search and that a warrantless search is on the surface 
unreasonable. 
The County Court Judge held that the provisions of s. 445 C.C . are valid 
without prerequisite conditions other than those contained in the section 
itself. The fact that it was quite easy and practical for the officers to 
have the recorder included in the warrant did not result in the section not 
applying in these circumstances. The justification for the invasion of the 
accused's privacy had already been considered when the warrant was issued. 
The officers had therefore not infringed the accused's right by not including 
the recording in the warrant. The finding of the recorder was a windfall 
issue and s. 445 C.C. applied 
NOTE: 
Crown's Appeal allowed 
New trial ordered 
The court in essence held that the search was not warrantless and 
that the seizure was by virtue of s.445 C.C. lawful 
1.:**** 
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URLAVFUL ARREST RF.SUI.TING IIf FIRDIRG PROCEEDS OF lJNRELATED CR.DIE 
IVIDEl!ICK ROT PIANATING FR.OK ACCUSED PERSOR - ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDEl!ICE 
Regina v. HANLEY -and PEARCE - County Court of Vancouver -
No. CC871135 - December 1987. 
Police officers entered a dwelling without knocking or announcing themselves 
to prevent the accused from avoiding arrest for possession of a stolen motor 
vehicle. While inside they observed proceeds from a break-in. A search 
warrant was obtained and those proceeds were seized. Defence counsel argued 
that these proceeds should not be admitted into evidence. The evidence to 
justify the warrant was unlawfully obtained and admission of evidence 
resulting from that warrant would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute . 
The County Court Judge acknowledged the defence position but did nonetheless 
admit the evidence. The evidence had not ·been of the kind that emanated from 
the accused persons after some Charter right was infringed. Said the Court: 
"I simply say that a reasonable man on the street would 
think it was indeed a very strange state of affairs that 
our system had fallen into if evidence such as this should 
be excluded in the circumstances of this case. I think 
they would wonder and certainly would be most likely to 
consider that we have changed our legal system in a way 
which a reasonable man would not approve." 
Evidence admitted. 
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STATEMENT - VOIDNTARINESS - RIGHT TO .COUNSEL 
Regina v. DA SILVA - Supreme Court of British Columbia -
Vernon, BC, N017240 - November 1987 
The accused was allegedly involved in clubbing someone to death with a 
baseball bat. He was very skillfully interviewed for several hours. This 
interview was taped without the accused's knowledge and was transcribed for 
presentation in Court. At trial the Crown sought to have the statement 
admitted into evidence. To prevent this, defence counsel claimed that there 
were inducements: that the accused's right to counsel had been infringed; and 
that taping the conversation without his knowledge was an impropriety. 
The officer's exceptional skill in interviewing a suspect had in this case, 
not affected the voluntariness of the statement.* In response to a submission 
that the accused was no match for the officer, the Court acknowledge that the 
latter is an adroit interrogator, but added: 
"There is nothing wrong with that. Indeed excellence in 
police investigatiorts should be applauded, not condemned." 
It was also suggested that the encouragements for the accused to speak were in 
fact inducements. The accused was asked to tell the truth and it was 
suggested to him that lack of intent to kill the victim could result in a 
lesser charge. The Court held that an encouragement to tell the truth without 
any suggestion that the system will be more generous in return is not an 
inducement. The simple statement that lack of intent to kill is capable of 
reducing murder to manslaughter was an accurate statement of law and that did 
not effect the voluntariness of the statement made by the accused. 
Suppressing his personal views of taping an interview without the knowledge of 
the interviewee, the Supreme Court Justice held that it was a perfectly legal 
practice that does not abuse the process of the Court. For all these reasons 
the statement was voluntary and admissible. 
Then defence counsel submitted that the statement should be excluded under s. 
24 (2) Charter as the accused's right to counsel had been infringed. 
At the outset of the interview the accused was told of and understood his 
right to counsel. He was also told that the interview was in relation to a 
certain murder. The Court was satisfied that there was no further obligation 
on police to explain the Charter right. 
*supreme Court of Canada - Intellectual superiority affecting volun-
tariness - See Volume 7, page 22 - 3 Y.W.R. (1979] 1. 
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At the outset of the interview the accused was told of and understood his 
right to counsel He was also told that the interview was in relation to a 
certain murder. The Court was satisfied that there was no further obligation 
on police to explain the Charter right. 
Well into the interview the accused, in answer to "How did it happen?", 
answered, " .... don't you think I should have a lawyer for this? Man, this is 
fuckin heavy shit, man." In reaction to this the officer reminded the 
accused of his rights, but did nothing more. 
The Court found that the accused had not requested a lawyer but had only asked 
if he should have one. 
Shortly after the accused said, "Wanna get to talk to a lawyer, man" Again he 
was assured he could do this anytime he wanted and was asked if he did not 
remember what he was told at the outset of the interview. He responded, 
"Yeah, but you dragged me in here. Fuckin two hours ago, whatever it was. 
With barely fuckin .... I should have just stayed there, man. Fuck around!" 
The officer then repeated his last question and the interview continued. 
The Court considering the context of these utterances by the accused concluded 
that they amounted to a request for counsel that was abandoned as he 
considered it to be of no value anymore considering what he had already told 
police. 
The Court concluded that the accused had failed to show that his right to 
counsel had been infringed. 
Statement admitted 
* * * * * 
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POLICE OPINION EVIDENCE THAT ACCUSED BELONG 
TO ASIAN YOUTH GANG 
Regina v. CHU and SHUlf and JILLSON - County Court of Vancouver -
CC871893 - May 1988 
The accused were being tried for assault causing bodily harm. The Crown 
called on a police witness purported to be an expert on Asian youth gangs He 
testified that in his opinion the accused belonged to such a gang known as 
"Lotus". 
Needless to say defence counsel objected to this evidence going in. The 
defence claimed that membership was irrelevant as the charge was assault and 
not that the accused were members. Secondly they argued that the policeman's 
evidence was based on hearsay and content of inadmissable statements. Thirdly 
they submitted that it would be so prejudicial to the accused that it 
overshadowed whatever probative value if any, the evidence might have. 
A voir dire was held as a consequence. The Trial Judge reminded defence 
counsel that the nature and known activities of organizations a person belong 
to may be relevant to identification. For instance, proof that a person is a 
member of a mafia family may help to show motive for committing acts or 
offences that are common to such members. In addition to other evidence of 
identification of an accused, evidence of such membership may be relevant and 
have weight to identify him as the person who committed the crime. In other 
words, motive is relevant to identity. Furthermore membership is capable to 
rebut a defence of innocent intent as certain activities are within the 
behaviour pattern of the organization. 
In regards to one of the accused the police witness had personal knowledge 
that he was a Lotus gang member. The others he concluded were members--also 
based on information he received from reliable sources. Held the Court: 
" ..... Police officers are entitled to rely on hearsay 
evidence as a basis for forming an opinion that a given 
fact exists ..... "* 
The police officer's opinion evidence on membership, activities and 
organization of Asian gangs was admissible. 
*coLLINS v. The Queen 
this publication 
* * * * * 
(1987) 33 C.C C (3)1 ... Volume 27, page 1 of 
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IRJ1JRED DRIVER. Ilf HOSPITAL - DFJIAND FOR BLOOD TEST 
IS TIIERE CUSTODY? - REroSAL BASED ON FEAR FOR AIDES 
Regina v. HARDER - County Court of Yale - Kamloops 
31178, June 1988 
The accused was involved in an accident and was injured. The investigating 
constable formed the opinion from observation and talking to him that his 
ability to drive was impaired. No sobriety test was asked for and no right to 
counsel warning was given. The accused went to the hospital via ambulance 
and was placed in the care of the medical staff. Approximately 45 minutes 
later the officer arrived at the hospital and made a demand for a sample of 
the accused's blood. The officer was refused as was the doctor prior to the 
officer's arrival at the hospital. The accused told each of them that he was 
afraid of getting Aids from hospital needles. At no time was the accused 
given his rights to counsel. Nevertheless he was convicted of refusing to 
provide the blood sample. He appealed that conviction. 
At trial the officer explained that he would have "informed the accused of his 
right to counsel had he thought him to be detained. He was not detained by 
the officer at all, agreed the Trial Judge, but was simply an injured person 
being cared for in a hospital. No sobriety tests were performed or asked for 
and even the transport was done by medical people. A demand by itself does 
not constitute detent~on in these circwnstances. The demand, or the refusal 
for that matter, did not change anything in regards to the accused's freedom 
or ability to move at will or to the restraint placed upon him by his medical 
condition. Compliance with the demand would not have affected that restraint 
either. And, #Even if I am wrong about this detention matter, admitting 
evidence of the refusal could not bring disrepute on the administration of 
justice" the trial judge had said 
Defence counsel argued that the option of complying with the demand or facing 
a criminal charge entitled the accused to his right under s. 10 of the 
Charter. Also, it was argued that despite the hospital staff not having any 
authority to control a person to the extent that he is detained, the majority 
of people will not remove themselves without specific permission. 
The County Court Judge bought the latter argument and held that the accused 
was detained when the demand was made. However, the officer had acted in good 
faith which permits the evidence of refusal to be admitted. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction of refusing upheld 
* * * * * 
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!ACK OF DETAINEE'S DILIGENCE IN EXERCISING 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL - ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS 
Regina v. SHITH - BC Court of Appeal - CA007697 Vancouver -
July 1988 
Five months after pub staff were robbed, the accused was arrested during the 
night for his alleged part in the robbery. He was told of his rights and . the 
reason for his arrest He was asked not to discuss the reason for the arrest 
in the police car but to wait until they were at the police station. After an 
hour in cells the accused indicated that he wanted to contact his lawyer. 
However, the only number listed was the lawyer's office. Despite the 
officer's urgings for him to dial the office number, which might by means of 
recording tell him where to contact the counsellor, the ac.cused declined 
saying he'd phone in the morning. 
An hour later the accused was brought into an interview room and was asked 
about his role in the robbery. The accused said he wanted his lawyer present 
Replied the officer, "No problem, but with your lawyer you won't say anything 
I need to hear from you .... " The questioning continued and the accused 
pei;-slsted that he did not want to say anything unless his lawyer was present 
When asked why he wanted his lawyer there the accused said he wanted to 
explain to him first what had happened. The officers then observed that the 
lawyer would only advise him not to say anything to them. The accused 
indicated that he also assumed that to be so. 
The dialogue continued and the accused then agreed to tell the officers about 
the robbery, "off the record". This changed to him agreeing to make a written 
statement but, "I won't go to Court and testify." He then put in writing his 
participation in the robbery. The Trial Judge admitted the statement into 
evidence as a voluntary statement. He also held that the accused's right to 
counsel had not been infringed. The accused appealed only the latter decision 
to the B.C. Court of Appeal . 
Defence counsel argued that there was no urgency to the interview. The 
offence had occurred over 5 months ago and the officers were very much aware 
that the accused intended to consult counsel the following morning. He had 
indicated several times that he did not want to say anything until he received 
legal advice and despite this the questioning continued. Defence counsel 
compared the case with one decided by the Supreme Court of Canada last year. 
In that case a Manninen* (also suspected of armed robbery) responded to being 
accused by police with: "Prove it. I ain't saying anything until I see my 
lawyer." Despite this assertion police asked about the knife used in the 
robbery. This resulted in an answer that denied the use of a knife but 
admitted the robbery. The Supreme Court of Canada held that Manninen's right 
to counsel had been infringed. The only distinction in this and the 
-Manninen's case is that the accused Smith had been given an opportunity to 
use a phone to reach his lawyer, Manninen had not been afforded that 
*Regina v. HANNINEN - Volume 28, page 1 of this publication 
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opportunity. Besides having to make a detained suspect aware of his right to 
counsel, authorities are obliged to provide him a reasonable opportunity to 
accommodate the carrying out of that right and must in circumstances such as 
in Hanninen, cease their questioning or in any way solicit evidence from the 
detainee. 
It seemed that the accused had a binding precedent comp1etely on his side and 
the admissibility of the statement to police seemed doomed for exclusion. 
Of the three justices of the B.C. Court of Appeal, one saw no difference in 
this and the Hanninen case, however, his two colleagues did. The majority of 
the court held that the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1987 
Trembley* case (which came subsequent to the Manninen decision) had to be 
considered. Trembley, a suspected impaired driver procrastinated in 
consulting counsel. He had phoned people other than a 1awyer and no further 
time had been allowed him. The Supreme Court of Canada held that a detainee 
"not being reasonably diligent in the exercise of his right" could not thereby 
stifle continuation of police investigation. Defence counsel in this Smith 
case argued that the belligerent Trembley had to blow within two hours and 
that there was consequently an urgency to the matter. Furthermore his 
maneuvers were obviously to waste time and to sabotage the police investi-
gation. In his client's situation there was a different attitude, there was 
no urgency and his reluctance to contact his counsel that evening was a matter 
of courtesy and in no way a lack of diligence to exercise his right. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal held by majority: 
1. Police had fulfilled their duty to make the accused aware of his 
right to counsel; 
2. Police had provided the accused with ample opportunity to exercise 
his right to counsel; 
3. Yhen the accused failed in his efforts to contact counsel they had 
urged him to keep on trying; and 
4. The accused knowing that police wanted to interview him failed to 
make further attempts to reach counsel in the hour he had between 
his first attempt and the interview. 
These circumstances caused the Court to hold that the accused had not been 
diligent in exercising his right. Police had not committed any improprieties 
and were not unfair to the accused. When the accused failed to continue his 
efforts to exercise his right the police investigation was not thereby 
suspended. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. Statements by 
accused could not be excluded for 
infringement of his right to counsel. 
*R. v. TREMBLEY (1987) 2 S CR. 435, Volume 29, page 8 of this publication 
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JIUST DEl'ONFJ!IT OF APPLICATIOII 1'0 SF.AR.CH VARRAR'.I 
HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE REQUISITE GROUNDS? 
DOES IACX OF SUCH KNmn.EDGE RENDER SEARCH UNREASONABLE? 
Regina v. DIAHOND and CARDINAL - County Court of Yale -
Kamloops #1391 - January 1988 
Police officer #1 investigating a traffic offence, received information from 
his suspect that narcotics were kept by the two accused at a certain address 
from where it was sold. The informer also told Officer #l why a previous 
search ~f the premises had failed to produce any evidence. Officer #l 'relayed 
the information to Officer #2 who worked in the drug squad. Officer #l 
learned that what the informer had told him about this address and the 
previous search was accurate. 
One day, Officer #l received information from the same source that a quantity 
of narcotics were now kept at that address for retail. Officer #2 was 
notified at home . Officer #l did not make any notes about the information he 
received; he did not te·11 Officer #2 that his source was the same as the one 
who had given the accurate information before. Officer #2 attended the 
police station and related the information to Officer #3. That is, that there 
were narcotics kept for the purpose of trafficking at the address. He did not 
tell #3 anything of the background of this information. Officer #3 prepared 
an application for a search warrant and he then swore before a Justice of the 
Peace that he had reasonable and probable grounds for believing and did 
believe that a narcotic was kept for the purpose of trafficking at the 
address. The application did explain how Officer #l knew from a reliable 
source (who had been on the premises and knew first hand of the presence of 
the narcotic) that a narcotic was kept for retailing at the target address. 
Defence cotinsel for the two accused applied to have the warrant quashed in 
that it was issued to Officer #2 and #3 contrary to law and that 
consequently, the search was unreasonable. The two officers had been 
negligent and had mislead the Justice of the Peace by deposing that they had 
first hand reasonable and probable grounds, and had not been taking any steps 
to ensure that the source of the information was reliable. They, the three 
officers, had simply trusted each other as being reliable and responsible. 
The Crown is entitled to protect its source of information conceded the 
defence, but this should not be compounded by officers swearing to facts they 
have no personal knowledge of. Officer #1 should have sworn to the 
information to the warrant. In the circumstances he and only he could attest 
to the reliability of the source. 
Relying on a decision by the B.C. Court of Appeal in September of 1987* the 
County Court Judge held that the relaying of information ·from one officer to 
the next was not fatal to the warrant at all, despite the fact that Officer #3 
had been careless in assuming that Officer #l's informer was reliable. He 
should have made far greater efforts to ensure that his deposition was based 
*Regina v. R.J. WILLIAMS 
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on as much personal knowledge as he in the circumstances could obtain. 
However, there was no flagrant disregard, for the truth "approaching 
fraudulent behaviour". Officer #3 had simply made an assumption based on the 
judgement of a colleague. The practice was not endorsed by this court and was 
found to be one where too much liberty was taken. ~Corpcrate knowledge" where 
one peace officer who has grounds to act can give a colleague the same grounds 
for so acting by simply telling him that he has such grounds, may not quite 
cover the liberal approach taken by Officer #3. Nonetheless, the Court 
declined to quash the warrant or declare the search unreasonable. 
Evidence ruled admissible 
* * * * * 
- 42 -
MEANING OF "WILE COMMITTING• IN 
CONSTRUCTIVE MURDER PROVISIONS IN CRIKINAL IAV 
Regina v. PARE - 38 C. C. C. (3d) 97 -
Supreme Court of Canada 
The 17 year old accused had sexually assaulted a 7 year old boy. The victim 
said he was going to tell his mother as soon as he got home. To prevent this 
the accused firstly hung on to the victim for about 10 minutes trying to 
persuade him to keep quiet. When he realized that this was to no avail he 
strangled the boy and hit him over the head with an oil filter that happened 
to be lying about. He then tied a shoe lace around the boy's neck until he 
was dead. The indecent assault had amounted to undressing the boy and lying 
on top of him until he ejaculated beside the victim's penis. At the time of 
the offence the indecent assault section was still in effect and it was 
included in the crimes listed in the then s.214(5)(b) C.C. which caused a 
murder to be first degree murder if death was caused "while committing" that 
crime. 
The accused committed second degree.murder and only the provisions mentioned 
above, made it first degree murder if the murder was committed while he 
committed the indecent assault. The indecent assault was over with when the 
accused took the boy's life and yet the jury returned a verdict of first 
degree murder. The Trial Judge had been exhaustive in explaining the meaning 
of this provision by substituting it for other known phrases: "committed on 
the occasion of", "committed at the time of", "on the same occasion", "in the 
same circwnstances", etc. He clarified the words of the section by saying 
that they need not find that the accused was committing the indecent act with 
one part of his body while another part was used to take that person's life. 
In other words the acts need not occur simultaneously. 
The Quebec Court of Appeal reduced the conviction to second degree murder as 
"while committing" contrasts "after having committed". Then the Crown took 
this matter to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Supreme Court of Canada explained that section 214 C.C. does not create an 
offence but simply classifies murders by telling us when, what otherwise would 
be second degree murder is due to the circwnstances in which it was committed 
included in first degree murder. The argument by defence counsel is based on 
the literal meaning of the words used in the section, but does not take into 
account the tenor of the murder provisions in the Criminal Code in their 
entirety. Defence counsel wants to isolate the words in issue from the 
entire context and the law makers' obvious intent. In other words defence 
counsel urged the Court to take a contextual approach to interpreting this 
provision. However, the Court agreed with the defence that it would be 
erroneous to consider the actions of the accused as "facilitating his flight 
after he completed the indecent assault" [s. 213 (a) (ii) C.C.]. 
It may be of interest to note that courts of superior jurisdiction in Canada 
have taken opposing views on this issue. One person raped (as is then was) 
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and then tied up his victim. She got loose and he killed her. He was 
convicted of second degree murder as the taking of her life had not occurred 
simultaneously with the rape.* 
Subsequent to that case, a man who took the life of his victim after raping 
her was convicted of first degree murder as the court considered that "while 
committing" does not require an exact coincidence of the r:~e and the murder 
but "a close temporal and causative link between the two.n 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the narrow interpretation which calls 
for a simultaneous occurring of the offence and the causing of the death is 
contrary to common sense and the intent of Parliament. 
The court said that if the act that causes death and the acts constituting the 
offences mentioned in s. 213 C.C. "form part of one continuous sequence of 
events, forming a single transactionn then the death was caused while 
committing the underlying offence. 
* * * * * 
*R. v. KJELDSEN (1980) S3 C C C (2d) SS. 
**R. v. STEVENS (1984) 11 C.C.C. (3d) Sl8 
Crown's appeal was allowed 
Conviction of first degree 
murder was restored 
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SEARCHING SUSPECT 18 HOURS AFTER ARREST 
SEARCH VARRANT - COMMON LAV AUTHORITY 
Reg~ v. HILLER - 38 C.C.C. (3d) 252 -
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused was arrested for breaking into a place. Blood was found at the 
scene and the accused wore a blood stained bandage. The accused was remanded 
in custody and the officer did not realized until some 18 hours after the 
arrest the importance of the bandage. Not only that the accused was injured 
and perhaps had a cut consistent with what was found at scene but also to see 
if the blood at the scene and that of the accused matched. He applied for and 
was issued a search warrant for the bandage. The accused did not object and 
it was removed by a nurse at the hospital. The blood matched and the evidence 
of analyses was admitted. The accused was convicted and appealed. 
A warrant may only be issued for a building, receptacle or place (s. 443 C.C.) 
and the Crown conceded on appeal that the search was invalid. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal agreed and held that the Criminal Code does not provide for a 
warrant in these circumstances and that the taking of the bandage was done 
warrantless. However the search was not unreasonable. Despite the fact that 
the arrest had taken place some eighteen hours ago and the status of the 
custody had changed due to the accused's appearance before a Justice of the 
Peace, the officer had nonetheless the common law authority to search the 
accused and take from him anything he reasonably believed was connected with 
the charge or may be used as evidence. 
The search, and the seizure were lawful and reasonable. 
*~':*** 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
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LEGAL TID BITS 
CROSS-EXAKDIATION OF ACCUSED PER.SOR RE: CR.DIIRAL RECORD 
The accused was charged with the murder of one of his partners in the drug 
trade. Many of the Crown witnesses were hardened criminals and there was an 
inevitable credibility problem that favored the accused. The accused did 
testify himself and to place his credibility squarely before the jury the 
Crown asked him about his previous convictions for armed robbery, murder and 
a number of other convictions. Defence counsel moved that these questions not 
be allowed and that s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act did in this case not 
apply as due to the gravity of the previous offences the accused would be 
deprived of a fair trial (s. 11 Charter). Not so, said the Supreme Court of 
Canada. Concealing the criminal record of an accused who testifies would 
deprive a jury from properly dealing with the issue of credibility. At the 
end of the day the jury would have a misleading and distorted picture in terms 
of who to believe. 
CORBEIT v The Queen - Supreme Court of Canada - May 1988 
* * * * * 
VALIDITY OF ·uousK-RREAKING IllSTR.UKENTS· OFFENCE 
The accused attacked the validity of s. 309 (1) C.C. which prohibits 
possession of house-breaking instruments without having a lawful excuse To 
prove such an excuse "lies upon" the possessor. The accused claimed that this 
section violates the presumption of innocence [s. ll(d) Charter]. By majority 
judgement the Supreme Court of Canada disagreed with the accused. It held 
that this was not a reverse onus or a presumption against the accused. The 
wording of the section does not force the accused to prove his innocence, 
rather it assures that the defence of innocent purpose is available to him. 
After all since 1972 the possession must be for a specific purpose before it 
amounts to an offence. This converted the section from one where the accused 
had to prove his innocence to one where the Crown has to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, with the defence of "innocent purposew built-in. 
HOLHES v. The Queen - Supreme Court of Canada - May 1988 
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VICARIOUS LIABILITY PROVISION IN B. C. 's IL V. AC'f. 
A corporate entity was charged with hit and run under the B.C. Motor Vehicle 
Act. It was liable by virtue of s. 76 of that Act which attaches 
responsibility for offences under the Act to the car owner. Two provincial 
court judges have now declared s. 76 M.V. Act inconsistent with the Charter as 
the section does not provide for a "Due diligence" defence. This despite the 
B.C. Supreme Court finding no fault with the section in 1982, shortly after 
the constitution came into effect. The provincial court judges held that 
this precedent was not binding on them as the Supreme Court Justice had not 
had the benefit of recent cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada. What 
also influenced their decision was this vicarious liability section being 
coercive in that the innocent owner must either divulge the name of the driver 
or be prosecuted himself. The Crown appealed to the County Court of Vancouver 
Island which gave a brief response to the appeal. The Judge could find no 
reason for the provincial court judges not to follow the precedent binding on 
them. Acquittal was set aside and a conviction was recorded. 
Regina v. ROLD Enterprises Ltd . - Campbell River 13602 - May 1988 
* * * * * 
GROUNDS FOR DEMAND PRECEDING FIAllED ROADSIDE SOBRIETY TEST 
A police officer testified that he formed the opinion that the ability of the 
driver of a car was impaired by alcohol before he asked him to perform some 
sobriety tests. This test was followed by a demand for breath samples and 
advice of Charter Rights. Defence counsel argued that the accused was 
detained when asked to perform the sobriety test. Lack of Charter advice at 
that point of investigation constituted a Charter infringement that called for 
the exclusion of the certificate of analysis. That document was a result of 
the demand made upon grounds obtained by means of the sobriety test.* The 
Trial Judge held that the results of the Charter flawed sobriety test should 
be excluded from evidence. However, since the officer had grounds to make the 
demand prior to the sobriety test, the demand was lawful and legal and the 
certificate evidence was not obtained by a means that offended the Charter. 
The accused appealed his conviction that resulted from this reasoning. The 
County Court Judge who heard the appeal found no fault in the Trial Judge's 
logic. Accused's appeal was dismissed and conviction was upheld. 
Regina v. LINTCYIT - County Court of Cariboo - Prince George CC13218, 
April 1988 
* REGINA v. BONOGOFSKI - Volume 29, page 1 of this publication. 
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CONTEKP'r IN THE FACE OF DIE COURT - RIGlrl' TO COUNSEL 
During the arraignment of an accused person, someone in the audience laughed 
out loud. The Court Officer was ordered to bring the person forward. This 
was done with the youth laughing all the way. The Judge said, "I'm citing you 
for contempt of court" and he ordered the youth to be locked up until he would 
call him back later for sentencing. This was done and resulted in a 90 day 
prison term. The youth appealed and claimed the judge should have informed 
him of his right to counsel so he could have prepared for a defence or 
answer. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal agreed and remedied the situation 
under s. 24 (1) Charter by setting aside the contempt conviction. 
Regina v. S.H. - 40 C.C . C. (3d) 242 
* * * * * 
STATUTORY RAPE - DISCRIMINATION 
Two male persons were charged with having sexual intercourse with a female 
person under the age of fourteen years. The Trial Judge had stayed the 
proceedings as section 146 (1) C.C. is in his opinion inconsistent with s. 15 
of the Charter in that the Parliament failed to create the same offence for 
female persons who have sexual intercourse with a male person under the age of 
fourteen years. The Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed and ordered new trials. 
Considering the purpose and effect of the section and the graver consequences 
to young female persons and society it is neither unfair or irrational to 
consider it a crime against a male person to have sexual intercourse with a 
girl under fourteen. 
Regina v. BOYLE - Regina v. HESS - 40 C.C.C. (3d) 193 
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ARBITRARY DETENTION AFTER INVESTIGATION IS COMPLETE 
The accused was processed as a suspected impaired driver. After he gave his 
samples of breath he was for reasons unknown detained for another 12 hours. 
The Trial Judge considered this detention to be arbitrary and stayed the 
proceedings as a remedy for this infringement. The Alberta Court of Appeal in 
reviewing the case held in essence that the arbitrary detention came at the 
conclusion of the investigation. No evidence was obtained by or during that 
detention neither was anything altered on account for it. Actually the 
detention was separate from the charge before the trial court. Section 24(2) 
of the Charter only deals with exclusion of evidence obtained by means of a 
Charter infringement. Subsection (1) only permits a remedy to be imposed . 
The stay of proceedings did not remedy the alleged arbitrary detention as it 
was irrelevant to the charge. If the accused sought a remedy in these 
circumstances he would have to do it separately from his criminal trial. 
Regina v. CUTFORTH - 40 C.C.C. (3d) 253 
* * * * * 
MEANING OF •ACCIDENT• IN HIT & RUN 
The accused had an altercation and a fight with a Mr. W. When the accused 
left the bar in which all this took place he used his car to push W's 
automobile in to the wall of the bar doing considerable damage to the vehicle 
and building. Needless to say the accused did not stay around. Consequently 
he was charged with hit and run in addition to mischief. This caused a 
conflict as for hit and run the incident is to be nan accidentn while for the 
mischief charge it has to be a deliberate act. Upon appeal the Supreme Court 
of Newfoundland held that there was no accident within the meaning of that 
noun as used in s. 233 (2) C.C. The offence was mischief only. 
Regina v. O'BRIEN - 39 C.C.C. (3d) 528 
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POLICE OWICER. FBrERING A HOKE TO CHEC«. OR 
PERSON IMPAIRED IH AH ACCIDOO 
A police officer received information from road workers that the accused had 
rolled his van. The workers had assisted the accused and had wanted to take 
him to a nearby hospital as he had some head injuries. However upon his 
insistence they had taken him to his cabin and left him there after 
administering first aid. Yb.en the officer arrived at the cabin the door was 
found ajar and knocking nor calling resulted in any response. The officer 
entered and found the accused sitting on a raised hearth. Questions were 
answered and an arrest for impaired driving resulted. The accused 
successfully argued for suppression of all the evidence. He claimed the 
officer trespassed, infringed his right to privacy and had conducted an 
unreasonable search. The Crown appealed and the District Court of Ontario 
reversed the Trial Judge's findings. He held considering the officer's 
mandate to protect and preserve life as well as the preservation of peace 
coupled with the information he had, it was his duty in the circumstances to 
enter the cabin. The entry did not infringe any of the accused's right or 
freedoms. 
Regina v. DElfERS - 39 C.C.C. (3d) 535 
* * * * * 
ENTER.ING PRIVATE RESIDENCE TO EFFECT ARREST 
The accused was involved with police during a disturbance. The accused then 
went to the home of an acquaintance. Yb.en police arrived to effect an 
arrest they properly announced their presence and purpose. The accused struck 
the arresting officer over the head with a whiskey bottle and caused him 
bodily harm. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the accused's claim that he 
was legally assisting the home owners in preventing a trespasser from 
entering. Police were legally on the premises and were entitled to enter for 
the sole purpose of the arrest. Furthermore, even if the officers had been 
trespassers the force used would have been excessive. Appeal dismissed and 
conviction for assault peace officer causing bodily harm was upheld. 
Regina v. HILLER - Supreme Court of Canada - 39 C.C.C. (3d) 288 
